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THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AS A TREATY
PROVIDING FOR AN "OBJECTIVE
REGIME"
Bruno Simmaf
INTRODUCTION
In the doctrine of international law, recognition of the general
principle of pacta tertiis has always been accompanied by the search
for exceptions in the form of treaties that do create legal effects, rights
or obligations, for third states. Discussion concentrates on so-called
"status-creating, .... dispositive" or "constitutive" treaties, and "trea-
ties providing for objective regimes."1 These terms characterize agree-
ments that define the status of a state, a certain territory, or an
international waterway by establishing a legal regime that is intended
to be valid and binding erga omnes. Recognition of treaties of this
kind, however, strains a consensual understanding of international
law. The possible legal foundations of erga omnes effects of treaty
obligations, therefore, are hotly disputed. 2
In the recent literature on this topic, the Antarctic Treaty3 is
quite frequently cited as an example of either what an author believes
to constitute a true objective treaty regime valid erga omnes or what he
thinks other writers falsely believe to be one.4
t Professor of International Law, University of Munich. The Author is indebted to
his research assistant, Stefan Brunner, for invaluable help that went well beyond the
compilation of materials.
1. The concept of "objective regimes" is presently discussed by the International Law
Commission (ILC). It has been introduced by Professor Riphagen, the Commission's third
Special Rapporteur on the topic of state responsibility, to denote a special category of treaty
obligations that limit the applicability of countermeasures against internationally wrongful
acts. Objective regimes discussed in this paper may share this quality, but the concept
under consideration in the ILC is far broader; the concept embraces, for example, treaties
concluded for the protection of human rights.
2. See, e.g., E. KLEIN, STATUSVERTRXGE IM V6LKERRECHT: RECHTSFRAGEN TER-
RITORIALER SONDERREGIME (1980). This paper applies part of Professor Klein's theoreti-
cal framework, although this Author does not share the main thesis of the Klein study.
3. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780,402 U.N.T.S. 71.
The complete text of the Treaty appears in the Appendix, infra.
4. This paper will not deal separately with the question of whether the Antarctic
Treaty regime is a "regional arrangement" authorized under article 52 of the U.N. Charter.
Charter of the United Nations, 1977 U.N.Y.B. 1181, art. 52. For a discussion of this issue,
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Thus, Ren6-Jean Dupuy wrote in 1960 that what had happened
with regard to Antarctica was that
un coll&ge international se comporte comme un ensemble gouvernemental et
organise le statut d'une r6gion.... Pour que ce statut soit valable pour les non-
signataires, encore faut-il que ceux qui Pont &abli soient en &at de le faire
respecter .... Admettons qu'il s'agit d'un trait6 portant statut d'un territoire et,
comme tel, opposable erga omnes. Accept6 ou non, formellement ou tacite-
ment, par le reste de la collectivit6 internationale, aucun 6l6ment exterieur A lui
ne peut .... modifier sans leur accord, le r6le particulier des douze.
5
The same view was expressed in a major Soviet textbook of inter-
national law which stated categorically that the Antarctic Treaty must
be considered valid erga omnes.6 Interestingly, the leading Soviet
international lawyer, Professor Tunkin, who had represented the
Soviet Union at the Washington Conference, held a quite different
opinion. Professor Tunkin maintained that the Antarctic Treaty
intended "to create a regime which could become universally
accepted. But there had been no intention of imposing that regime:
any attempt to do so would have been illegal."'7 A majority of com-
mentators share this view.8
see Hayton, The Antarctic Settlement of 1959, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 349, 366-67 (1960); Santa
Cruz, The Antarctic System and the Utilization of Resources, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425,
439 (1978).
5. Dupuy, Le Traitdsur l'4ntarctique, 6 ANNUAIRE FRANgAIS DE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL 111, 121-22 (1960). Other writers advocating opposability toward third parties
include Santa Cruz, supra note 4, at 433 ("at least tacitly accepted"); Guyer, The Antarctic
System, 139 RECUEIL DES COURS 153, 223-26 (1973); Guyer, Antarctica's Role in Interna-
tional Relations, in ANTARCTICA RESOURCES POLICY: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLIT-
ICAL ISSUES 267, 278-79 (F. Orrego Vicufia ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Vicufia]; van der
Essen, The Application of the Law of the Sea to the Antarctic Continent, in Vicufia, 231, 241
("global jurisdiction ... which is not envisioned in the Treaty, but which has become
established through twenty years of practice"); Heap, Cooperation in the Antarctic: A
Quarter of a Century's Experience, in Vicufia 103, 107; Miller, Comment: The Impact of
UNCLOS 1I on the Antarctic Regime, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE: CONFLICTING INTER-
ESTS, COOPERATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 169,
173 (R. Wolfrum ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Wolfrum], (assuming opposability toward
third parties, although expressly rejecting the term "objective regime"); Jung, Comment, in
Wolfrum at 177.
6. 3 KURS MEZHDUNARODNOVO PRAVA 402 (1967), quoted in Boczek, The Soviet
Union and the Antarctic Regime, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 834, 856 (1984).
7. [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 107, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/167/1964.
8. See, e.g, Hanessian, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 436, 470
(1960); Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antibrctica, 531 INT'L CONCILIATION 245, 299 (1961);
Mouton, The International Regime of the Polar Regions, 107 RECUEIL DES COURS 174,
257-59 (1962); Cahier, Le probldme des effets des traits d l'egard des Etats Tiers, 143
RECUEIL DES COURs 589, 660-79 (1974); Pinto, The International Community andAntarc-
tica, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 482 (1978); Brownlie, Legal Status of Natural Resources in
International Law (Some Aspects), 162 RECUEIL DES COURs 245, 293 (1979); Barnes, The
Emerging Antarctic Living Resources Convention, 73 PROCEEDINGS OF TH4E AM. Soc'V
INT'L L. 272, 286 (1979); Peterson, Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush on Earth, 34
INT'L ORG. 377, 399-400 (1979); Burton, New Stresses on the Antarctic Treaty: Toward
International Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65 VA. L. REV. 421, 441-42
n.108, 504 (1979); F.M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 115-29 (1982): Bilder.
The Present Legal and Political Situation in Antarctica, in THE NEW NATIONAL.ISM AND
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The same divergence of opinions appears in official government
pronouncements. For instance, in the 1984 study of the United
Nations Secretary-General, Chile stated that "[by] virtue of its tacit or
express recognition of the Antarctic Treaty, the entire international
community is bound by the provisions governing claims in Antarc-
tica." 9 Pakistan, in contrast, argued that the Antarctic Treaty "can-
not be the basis of a legal regime binding the international community
as a whole." 10
Given this dispute within the international community, a closer
study of third party effects of the Antarctic Treaty system does not
seem to be a purely academic exercise. With a regime on Antarctic
mineral resources taking shape and the issue on the agenda of the
U.N. General Assembly, the political and economic significance of the
question becomes obvious. The 1959 system seems to approach its
decisive challenge.
The "Antarctic Club" has taken various steps to open up the
Treaty system to newcomers and to relax conditions for consultative
membership.1 But it appears that the majority of U.N. member
states shows no inclination to change sides. There is a need to know,
therefore, whether, and eventually in which respects, those states,
legally speaking, have to take cognizance of the present and the future
Antarctic Treaty regime.
The analysis in this paper develops in two steps. First, the paper
specifies three theoretical approaches that have been suggested to
account for erga omnes effects of objective treaty regimes. This discus-
sion also evaluates the relevance and persuasiveness of these
approaches when applied to the Antarctic Treaty and its regime. In
the second part of the paper, a few observations on the position of
third states toward a future regime on Antarctic mineral resources
worked out by the "Antarctic Club" will be put forward. 12
THE COMMON USE OF SPACES 167, 202 (J. Charney ed. 1982); R. WOLFRUM, DIE
INTERNATIONALISIERUNG STAATSFREIER RX UME 96 n.253 (1983); Boczek, The Protec-
tion ofthe Antarctic Ecosystem, 13 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 347, 386-88 (1983/84); Lagoni,
Die Vereinten Nationen und die Antarktis, 39 EUROPA-ARCHiv 473, 479-80 (1984); Luard,
Who Owns the Antarctic?, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1175 (1984).
9. Question ofAntarctica, Study Requested Under General Assembly Resolution 38/77,
Report of the Secretary General, 39 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 66), U.N. Doc. A/
39/583 (1984), part II, at 32 [hereinafter cited as Report of the Secretary-General].
10. Id. at 34.
11. On the relaxation of conditions, see Auburn, Consultative Status Under the
Antarctic Treaty, 28 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 514 (1979).
12. The Author assumes that his readers will be familiar with the provisions of the
1959 Treaty and their factual background, particularly with the "purgatory of ambiguity"
embodied in article IV, and with article X on third states. See generally Barcel6. Tile
International Legal Regime For Antarctica, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 155 (1986).
19861
192 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The theoretical approaches to a possible erga omnes effect of
objective regimes in general and their application to the Antarctic
Treaty system in particular may be classified briefly as follows. 13 The
first group of theorists includes several prominent Special Rapporteurs
of the International Law Commission. They have tried to solve the
problem of erga omnes effect by treating it as a special concept within
the law of treaties and by finding a solution through an exception to
the pacta tertiis rule. A second group of scholars has developed what
Lord McNair called "public law theories" which assume a quasi-legis-
lative competence of certain states to regulate a territorial issue with
validity erga omnes. Finally, a third school examines the effects of
various processes upon third states vis-A-vis treaties intended to estab-
lish "objective" territorial regimes. These processes include recogni-
tion, acquiescence and estoppel, historic consolidation, and formation
of customary international law.
I. THE LAW OF TREATIES APPROACH
The law of treaties approach culminated in the efforts of the
International Law Commission (ILC) to draw up what was to become
the Vienna Convention of 1969.14 The first proposal to address trea-
ties providing for objective regimes as an exception to the pacta tertlis
rule was enunciated in Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's Fifth Report of
1960.15 Sir Gerald was prepared to accept binding effects of treaties
vis-A-vis non-parties as an outflow of two principles. The first princi-
ple acknowledges a general duty of states to respect, recognize, and
accept the consequences of lawful and valid international acts entered
into between other states, which do not infringe the legal rights of
states not parties to those acts. The second principle dictates that the
act of user implies consent to the conditions of use.16
The draft articles relevant in this context are Sir Gerald's articles
14,17 17,18 and 18.19 Articles 17 and 18 embody the first principle of
"status erga oinnes." Article 14 expresses the second principle of
implied consent. Paragraph 1 of article 14 covered treaties concerning
the territory of another state; paragraph 2 referred to territory placed
by treaty under an international regime of common use "in circum-
13. For a similar approach, see Wolfrum, Book Review, 24 GYIL 533 (1981) (distin-
guishing between a "contractual approach," a "real rights and obligations approach," and
a "law-making theory").
14. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969),
reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969).
15. [1960] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/130/1960.
16. Id. at 77, 87, 93, 98.
17. Id. at 79.
18. Id. at 80.
19. Id.
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stances causing the treaty to have, or to come to be regarded as hav-
ing, effect erga omnes."20
Sir Gerald himself was not really sure how to distinguish article
14, paragraph 2 cases from those provided for in article 18 regarding
the obligation of the third state to conform to the treaty conditions as
to user. Sir Gerald explained the difficulty of distinguishing these two
cases as follows:
In practice, it can no doubt be said that where all the States having, in respect
of a given region or area, territorial rights or claims to such rights, or a possible
basis of claim, or otherwise directly interested, have established by treaty a
regime of permanent or quasi-permanent user . . . , in such a way that the
position of other States is not prejudiced or impaired, nor their general interna-
tional law rights affected, it is extremely likely that the treaty will be regarded,
as being effective erga omnes.
2 1
According to Sir Gerald, the Antarctic Treaty constituted an article
14, paragraph 2 situation. 22
The fundamental problem with the Fitzmaurice articles, however,
is that the draft articles beg the most important question: they presup-
pose the validity erga omnes of certain treaty regimes. The draft arti-
cles fail to address the problem of whether a regime like the Antarctic
Treaty system could have a binding effect upon third states at all, and
if so, on what grounds. Article 14, paragraph 2, the "Antarctica arti-
cle," imported an erga omnes test "perhaps somewhat illogically," as
Sir Gerald himself admitted.23 According to Sir Gerald, the legiti-
macy of an erga omnes effect of a territorial regime depends upon the
participation of all states interested in the regime's establishment or
entitled to participate in it. Whether we assume that Antarctica still
has the status of a terra nullius or assume that it is a common space,
this condition of participation by all interested states does not seem to
have been met in 1959 or since. Article 14 embodies the principle that
one may enjoy the benefits only if one is prepared to bear the burdens
in return. But this principle cannot reasonably be applied to Antarc-
tica if free access were enjoyed by all states at any rate.
The draft articles proposed to the ILC by Sir Gerald were not
discussed in the Commission. But his successor as Special Rapporteur
on the law of treaties, Sir Humphrey Waldock, raised the issue again
in his Third Report of 1964.24 In that report, Sir Humphrey proposed
an article 6325 on "Treaties providing for objective regimes," again, a
20. Id. at 79.
21. Id. at 93.
22. Id. at 93-94.
23. Id. at 93.
24. [1964] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/1964/Add.l-3.
25. Id. at 26-27.
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provision expressly designed to account for the Antarctic Treaty.26
Sir Humphrey observed that certain types of treaties create objec-
tive legal regimes for particular areas, either at once or at least within
a short period of time.27 In order to qualify for such effects erga
omnes, however, such a treaty must, according to the Special Rap-
porteur, have been concluded with the intention to create in the gen-
eral interest obligations and rights relating to a particular region. 28
Further, any states having territorial competence with reference to the
subject-matter of the treaty must either be a party to the treaty or at
least have consented to the provisions in question.29
According to the Special Rapporteur, if a treaty regime meets
these requirements, it deserves to be endowed with effect erga omnes as
speedily as possible. Therefore, in paragraph 2 of article 63, Sir
Humphrey sought to provide the means necessary to satisfy these
requirements. 30 He suggested that the consent requirement could be
met by express or implied consent plus a presumption of implied con-
sent if a third state did not protest against or otherwise manifest its
opposition to the regime within a given period of time (Sir Humphrey
himself proposed 5 years) after the treaty's registration. 31 Sir
Humphrey maintained that if the Commission did not include the pro-
posed article 63 in its draft, the accretion of effects erga omnes to an
objective regime
would have to be left to be covered by custom which was necessarily a slower
process. His intention in drafting article 63 had been to provide legal machin-
ery for accelerating the process of recognition of such a regime as part of the
established international legal order. In that type of situation, it could be said
that tacit recognition ought to be regarded as being established quite quickly,
as it has been [!] in such cases as the Antarctic Treaty and the Austrian State
Treaty. 3
2
Commenting on the Antarctic Treaty in particular, Sir Humphrey
maintained that
[a]lthough the parties had included an accession clause in the treaty ... , there
was a clear intention to create an objective legal regime for Antarctica ....
Accordingly, it would be inadmissible for any State not a party to the treaty to
claim that Antarctica was res nullius.33
If one reads these lines together with the preconditions for the
objective character of a treaty regime presented in article 63, one must
26. Id. at 29, 30.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 33.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 26-27.
31. Id. at 33.
32. [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 108, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/1964.
33. Id. at 105; cf Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 9, part I, para. 158
(discussing the question of a "legal regime").
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conclude, with all due respect to Sir Humphrey, that the Special Rap-
porteur did not take into account fully the complexity of the Antarctic
Treaty. It seems that Sir Humphrey placed great emphasis on the
concepts of free access for scientific purposes and demilitarization, but
that he did not consider sufficiently the intricacies of article IV of the
Antarctic Treaty.
A reading of paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 6334 reinforces this
observation. These provisions would have entitled third states that
had expressly or impliedly accepted the regime not only to invoke the
provisions of the regime and to exercise any general right which its
terms and conditions may confer, but also to participate in the amend-
ment or revocation of the regime.
It is obvious that the Contracting Parties of the Antarctic Treaty
never intended to grant third states such sweeping rights. For
instance, if one applied Sir Humphrey's proposal to article IV, para-
graph 2 (the "constitution" of Antarctic cooperation), third states
would not only have been bound by the prohibition of new claims, but
would also have been entitled to invoke this prohibition against the
claimant contracting parties. In this way, the "constructive ambigu-
ity" of article IV, paragraph 2 would have worked in favor of third
states.35 It is clear, however, that because the Antarctic Treaty does
not purport to settle the territorial question, any entitlement of third
parties in this field could only be detrimental to the system's operation.
Article 63 was widely criticized by members of the Commission.
According to Tunkin, the parties to the 1959 Conference had not
intended to impose a regime in Antarctica, and draft article 63 "cre-
ated more problems than it solved."' 36 Rosenne, on the other hand,
contended that the provision belonged to the lex lata.37 Verdross
stated that the article was in no way revolutionary because it was
based entirely on the idea of consent 38-which is not the whole truth,
of course, if the presumption of implied acceptance embodied in para-
graph 2(b) is taken into account: a clause that drew the vigorous
opposition of Jim~nez de Ar~chaga, according to whom states "would
undoubtedly prefer the present situation, in which they remained
legally unconcerned by what constituted for them res inter alios acta,
retaining their freedom to take a position with respect to any such
34. [1964] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 37, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/167/1964.
35. Compare the discussion about the "pooling" of claims as a possible breach of a
treaty obligation (article IV, paragraph 2) in 1 W.M. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTER-STATE AND NATIONAL DOCUMENTS § 61(f)-(i)
(1982).
36. [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 103, 107, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1964.
37. Id. at 104.
38. Id. at 99.
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treaty only if and when the need to do so arose."' 39 This is indeed the
very heart of the matter.
In the end, article 63 was deleted. The ILC discussion was sum-
marized in the following part of the commentary to the Commission's
draft article 34 of 1966 (now article 38 of the Vienna Convention):
The Commission considered whether treaties creating so-called "objective
regimes," that is, obligations and rights valid erga omnes, should be dealt with
separately as a special case .... Some members of the Commission favoured
this course, expressing the view that the concept ... existed in international
law and merited special treatment in the draft articles .... [T]hey cited the
Antarctic Treaty as a recent example of such a treaty. Other members, how-
ever, while recognizing that in certain cases treaty rights and obligations may
come to be valid erga omnes, did not regard these cases as resulting from any
special concept or institution of the law of treaties.
40
The ILC majority thus considered that validity erga omnes could
result by application, first, of the principle now embodied in article 36
of the Vienna Convention. Under article 36, a treaty may create rights
for third states if the original parties so intend and if the third state
assents thereto. This assent is presumed as long as the contrary is not
indicated. In addition, validity erga omnes may arise by conferring the
status of international customary law upon a treaty under the process
recognized in article 38 of the Vienna Convention. According to the
Commission, these two approaches furnished a legal basis for the
establishment of treaty obligations and rights valid erga omnes,
"which goes as far as is at present possible."' 41
The Commission did not include in the provisions fundamental to
the validity erga omnes concept its draft article 31 (now article 35 of
the Convention) on treaties providing for obligations for third states,
although the focus of such regimes certainly seems to be on obligation.
But article 35 requires that a third state expressly accept such an obli-
gation in writing; and a written acceptance, of course, would dissolve
the legal intricacy of an "objective regime."'42
Let us apply the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention
(articles 35-38) to the Antarctic Treaty to determine whether a third-
party effect can be established. It appears that some of the Treaty
obligations, including those expressed in article I, article IV, para-
graph 2, and article V, are indeed phrased in objective terms and could
thus, in theory, be intended to establish an obligation for third states.
Such a reading would not render article X useless, as Professor Cahier
39. Id. at 101.
40. [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 231, U.N. Doc. 4/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add.I.
41. Id.; see also Rozakis, Treaties and Third States: A Study in the Reinforcement of
the Consensual Standards in International Law, 35 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLNDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT [ZAoRV] 1, 7-13 (1975).
42. Rozakis, supra note 41, at 13.
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assumed,43 because article X could well be construed as establishing a
special treaty obligation concerning sanctions operating only inter
partes.
But even if these articles of the Antarctic Treaty had been drafted
with the intention of binding third states, third states would not have
accepted the articles expressly. Neither does the Antarctic Treaty
confer enforceable rights on third states. The Treaty indicates that its
parties were sensitive to the wider interests of the international com-
munity, but there is "no independent or intrinsic evidence of an intent
to elevate these interests into an enforceable right." 44 Furthermore,
the obligations that the Treaty imposes should not be considered as
mere conditions for the exercise of certain rights, such as free access
for scientific purposes or the right to accede. 45
To summarize, under the law of treaties as reflected in the Vienna
Convention, the Antarctic Treaty cannot produce validity erga omnes,
because silence of third parties cannot be taken as assent.46 The possi-
bility that customary law could provide the basis for such third-party
effects will be examined after a discussion of the "public law theories."
43. Cahier, supra note 8, at 664-65.
44. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory of
Ambiguity"?, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 201 n.28 (1985).
45. Treaty obligations could also become binding on non-parties through the latters'
tacit accession to the instrument. This possibility was acknowledged, although in a rather
reserved way, by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North Sea Continental
Shelf judgment. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 25-26 (Judge-
ment of Feb. 20) [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf]. But this concept does not appear
to be applicable to the Antarctic Treaty: the contracting parties did not envisage the pro-
cess of tacit accession, nor did any third state manifest an intention to adhere to the Treaty
in such a way. Moreover, the feasibility of tacit accession does not find support in state
practice. Upon closer reading, the ICJ really seemed to have in mind a special case of
estoppel. See infra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
46. When the International Law Commission discussed territorial regimes in the con-
text of state succession, see Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Trea-
ties, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.80/31, it referred to the discussion of draft article 63
concerning treaties providing for objective regimes. See supra note 40 and accompanying
text. The Commission reaffirmed that the objective character of such a regime did not
result from the treaty itself, but rather from its execution. [1972] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
305-06, para. 29. According to the Commission, the term "territory" was intended to
denote any part of the land, water, or air space of a state. Id. at 308, para. 39. Further-
more, article 12 of the Convention on Succession of States, supra, speaks of rights and
obligations "established by a treaty." At the Vienna Conference leading to the adoption of
the Convention (1978 Session), the Soviet delegate expressed the view that the proposals of
the Informal Consultations Group concerning article 12 were based on a "general under-
standing within the group that no succession of States would affect the demilitarization of
certain areas of territory ... or international regimes such as that which applied in Antarc-
tica." 2 Official Records 133-34, para. 27. In light of the above discussion, this statement
cannot be understood as dealing with third-party effects in general, but-at least with
respect to the Antarctic Treaty-only with contracting parties' succession into treaty
obligations.
198 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
II. THE "PUBLIC LAW THEORIES"
Public law theories proceed from the "quasi-legislative" authority
of certain states to make a territorial treaty regime binding upon third
states. Third parties are not bound by the treaty itself, but by the
exercise of competence to settle a matter with effects erga omnes. The
public law theory found its classic expression in Lord McNair's indi-
vidual opinion in International Status of South West Africa, in which
he stated:
From time to time it happens that a group of great Powers, or a large number
of States both great and small, assume a power to create by a multipartite
treaty some new international regime or status, which soon acquires a degree of
acceptance and durability extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting
parties, and giving it an objective existence. This power is used when some
public interest is involved .... 41
The question is, of course, where this power of the contracting
parties to act "in a semi-legislative capacity for the whole world, "48 as
Lord McNair put it on another occasion, comes from.
As Professor Klein's study shows, it has been derived from an
alleged function of the great powers "d 6tablir un v6ritable droit objec-
tif"; 49 from the idea of negotiorum gestio;50 from the participation or
placet of those states that have territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction
over the area concerned;51 from an analogy to the realization of gen-
eral interests of the international community by the United Nations;5 2
or from a special attribution of competence to the contracting parties
of a status-creating treaty.5 3
This last-mentioned view is shared by Professor Klein himself.
Because his theory is the most recent and most sophisticated among
the "public law" approaches, it will be examined in further detail.
47. International Status of South-West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 146, 153 (Separate Opinion
of July 11).
48. A.D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 266 (1961).
49. E. KLEIN, supra note 2, at 195.
50. See generally Krfiger, Geschdftsfzihrung ohne Auftragft'r die V67kergemeinschaft,
in FESTSCHRIFr F0R BILFINGER 169 (Mosler & Schreiber eds. 1954) [hereinafter cited as
Mosler & Schreiber].
51. See E. KLEIN, supra note 2, at 116-22 (referring to Spitzbergen and Antarctica as
prominent examples of terra nullius).
52. Id. at 198-209. For a discussion of the concept of representation, see Reuter,
Principes de droit international public, 103 RECUEIL DES COURs 425, 448-49 (1961).
53. Ballreich, V6lkerrechtliche Vertrdge zu Lasten Dritter, in Mosler & Schreiber, supra
note 50, at 1, 19. See also Ballreich, Treaties, Effect on Third States, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 476, 480:
If the contents of a treaty are appropriate, and are intended only to serve the com-
mon good, then article 35 should no longer be taken as meaning a clear prohibi-
tion. The obligation of the third State, which in such cases is an obligation of
toleration rather than an obligation of performance, would then take effect. The
special interests of the third State would also not suffer unduly as it would still
have the option to express rejection.
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According to Professor Klein, the first condition for the existence of
any objective treaty regime is the intention of its parties to serve the
general interest. The second condition is the assertion by the con-
tracting parties of their power to settle the matter in the general inter-
est with effect erga omnes. Professor Klein calls this assertion the
Ordnungsbehauptung of the parties. Article X of the Antarctic Treaty
is mentioned as a prominent example.54
Because the Ordnungsbehauptung is imbued with a heavy dose of
legitimacy (general interest, territorial jurisdiction, etc.), its develop-
ment from "inchoate" to full title to legislate erga omnes deserves
some assistance. Professor Klein provides this assistance by means of
a presumption:
Since an express attribution of the power to settle a matter erga omnes can only
seldom be ascertained, it is above all decisive whether there is a presumption
that the power has been attributed and under which circumstances it applies.
From the assertion made by the contracting parties to serve the general interest
and from the participation of the power which has territorial competence for
the settlement, there results such a strong legal claim that the attribution of the
asserted competence must be admitted by those States which have not objected
to this claim.
55
In short, the overpowering legitimacy of the claim creates a pre-
sumption that silence gives consent. Thus, the Ordnungsbehauptung
is granted validity erga omnes. In Professor Klein's view, the
Antarctic Treaty furnishes an example par excellence of this process.
According to Professor Klein's theory, a third state would at least
have the faculty to reject the assertion to make law erga omnes; for
that state, these rules would then remain res inter alios actae. Other
authors, however, do not even put so modest an obstacle in the way of
an Ordnungsbehauptung. Professor Mosler, for example, discussed
this issue in his 1974 General Course at the Hague Academy.
Although he admitted that "[ilt would certainly be an exaggeration to
say that third States are bound by the situation established by such a
treaty.. .", he went on to state: "But it may be that the interest either
of the whole community of States or of the States of a certain region in
the maintenance of such a status is so clear that much can be said in
favour of there being an obligation to acquiesce in it."'56
54. E. KLEIN, supra note 2, at 356. Guyer maintains a similar position; he admits,
however, "I understand the legal objections to this concept, but I believe that the problem
we are faced with here is not only a legal problem, but also one of legitimacy, i.e. a
'metajuridical' problem." Guyer, in Vicufia, supra note 5, at 278-79. Cf I. BROWNL1E,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 266 n.2 (3d ed. 1979): "[N]evertheless the
treaty bears some resemblance to treaties classified as 'constitutive or semi-legislative' by
Lord McNair .... Cf. also article X of the Antarctic Treaty: ... This provision could be
read as a clear admission that non-parties are not bound by the Treaty itself."
55. E. KLEIN, supra note 2, at 356.
56. Mosler, The International Society as a Legal Community, 144 RECUEIL DES COURS
1, 236 (1975) (emphasis added). Other scholars have stressed the principle of effectiveness.
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When applied specifically to the Antarctic Treaty, the "public
law" construction has been employed for different purposes. First, the
purpose is to recognize something short of sovereignty, maybe func-
tionally limited sovereignty, erga tertios, without necessitating a solu-
tion of the sovereignty issue within the treaty framework.5 7 Second,
the theory leaves the parties free to abolish the treaty. Third parties
would have no right either of revocation or amendment s8 (although it
has been suggested that the parties could not alter the regime with
complete freedom). 59 Third, the obligation of third parties would con-
sist merely of toleration rather than affirmative performance. 60 Fur-
ther, the theory has been used both for the denial of third states' rights
and as a basis of some "rights" of outsiders just because of the third
party construction. 6'
The scope of this paper does not allow a full critique of the public
law theories. Such a critique, however, might concentrate on the fol-
lowing points:
First, the construction of quasi-legislative competences of the
Contracting Parties with respect to Antarctica could, in light of article
IV, only work erga tertios, i.e., not against and between the claimant
States. There would, in effect, not be one status for Antarctica but
rather two: one for the Contracting Parties themselves and one valid
erga tertios.62
See, e.g., van der Essen, supra note 5, at 241-42; Miiller, supra note 5, at 173 ("developing a
regime 'sui generis' based on effective international administration").
57. This approach is clearly preferable to a real-rights approach based on absohlte title.
58. This effect explains why this theory is preferred to "customary law approaches"
with their inherently reciprocal relationships, see infra Part III, and to solutions within the
framework of the law of treaties, see supra note 24, at 27 (Sir Humphrey Waldock's pro-
posed article 63, paragraphs 3 and 4).
59. Mosler, supra note 56, at 236.
60. See Ballreich, Treaties, supra note 53.
61. See Delbriick, Comment, in Wolfrum, ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE supra note 5, at
119-20. The trust construction (Consultative Parties as trustees of the world community)
can be seen as an attempt to counterbalance third party effects with a quid pro quo for
outsiders. For the view that the trust concept already constitutes the lex lata, see Wolfrum,
The Use of Antarctic Non-Living Resources: The Search for a Trustee?, in id. at 143, 162-63
[hereinafter cited as Wolfrum, Search for a Trustee); Riedel, Comment, in id at 180-8 1.
The trust concept is correctly discussed as lexferenda in Barnes, supra note 8, at 288-89.
62. This construction would bypass the requirements for the existence of absolute
rights, which must be effective erga omnes. A numerus clausus of real rights probably
exists. See Burton, supra note 8, at 441-42 n.108 ("Strictly speaking, a group of states
could possess such jurisdiction only by virtue of a condominium or joint exercise or sover-
eignty over territory. .. . The Antarctic Treaty itself does not establish a condominium").
Furthermore, the maintenance of national positions in the sovereignty dispute is inconsis-
tent with a true exercise of joint sovereignty by Antarctic Treaty parties. Consequently,
Burton concludes that the "functional equivalent of a condominium has not been achieved
by all interested states pooling through an international treaty their respective jurisdictions
to prescribe and enforce law governing their respective nationals." Id.
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Second, a duty not to make claims in Antarctica during even a
prolonged transitional period does not amount to a grant of territorial
status. It is only a modus vivendi on the surface of an unresolved but
"frozen" dispute. As a consequence, even the question of whether the
relationship toward third parties is based on claims to sovereignty or
on some joint rights of the Consultative Parties remains unsolved.63
The Consultative Parties would be empowered to create an objec-
tive regime for Antarctica if they had territorial sovereignty over the
area.64 Some of these parties, however, do not recognize the claims of
others. The Antarctic Treaty not only leaves this issue unsettled, but
it "shelves" the conflicting claims and respective positions. This was
the conditio sine qua non for the Treaty's very conclusion. Therefore,
the Antarctic Treaty itself stands in the way of an assumption of erga
omnes effects through territorial competence. Clear-cut legal relation-
ships toward third states could be achieved only by "melting" the fro-
zen territorial issue and either returning to the claims situation
virulent before the Treaty or establishing a condominium.65
Third, the construct of an Ordnungsbehauptung is designed to
overcome the pacta tertiis rule which is a consequence of the principle
of sovereign equality. 66
Fourth, the proposition that "the stronger the claim, the more
rejection can be expected," is as logical as the proposition that "the
stronger the claim, the less mere silence can be taken as consent." If
rights are based on the silence of third parties, these perceived rights
must be construed restrictively because "tacit consent" cannot be pre-
sumed easily.
Fifth, an attribution of competences "once and for all" does not
reflect reality. The Antarctic legal system has gradually evolved and
broadened in scope. The system could more adequately be described
as a process of integration, despite diametrically opposed legal
positions.67
63. Barnes, supra note 8, at 288 ("conscious parallelism").
64. This situation exists, for example, for Norway under the Spitzbergen Treaty. See
Hambro, Some Notes on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration, 68 AM. J. INT'L
L. 217, 224 (1974).
65. So far, however, claimant states have tried to uphold the "conscious parallelism."
See id. at 224-25.
66. Wolfrum, Search for a Trustee, supra note 61, at 162.
67. The basic problem is that of reciprocity. One commentator advocates that a "once
and for all" attribution of competences is compatible with this principle:
If such forbearance on the part of States which are not currently parties to the
Antarctic Treaty system is to be a reality there has to be a quid pro quo. It seems
to me that the proper nature of such a quid pro quo is that future developments of
the Antarctic Treaty System should consist of the extension of the existing system
of obligations to deal with future problems.
Heap, supra note 5, at 108. Another commentator, however, argues that it "would be
unrealistic to believe that these States, perhaps the most numerous of all, would acquiesce in
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Sixth, in practice, the Consultative Parties have done anything
but assert strong legal claims. Instead of asserting a forceful
Ordnungsbehauptung, they have tried to keep a low profile.68 We shall
return to this point later.
Seventh, if Contracting Parties that are not Consultative Parties
are not bound by the "legislative competence" of the Consultative Par-
ties through Recommendations, third states are, a fortiori, under no
obligation in this respect. 69
III. THE "SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE" APPROACH IN THE
FACE OF A CHANGE IN PARADIGMS
We now turn to the last group of theories. According to these
theories, the informal processes of customary law, historic consolida-
tion, recognition, acquiescence, and estoppel can transform a contrac-
tual regime for a certain territory into a body of rules valid erga
omnes.
It has already been mentioned that, in the opinion of no less an
expert body than the International Law Commission, a treaty regime
intended to be "objective" might acquire erga omnes effect through the
operation of customary international law-a process which Sir
Humphrey Waldock attempted to speed up by his draft article 63.
Doubts can be raised, however, whether this could work (or could
have worked) in the case of the Antarctic Treaty.
In his valuable work, Antarctica and International Law, W.M.
Bush summarized the following arguments in support of the view that
the Antarctic Treaty now reflects customary international law. First,
there was pre-existing state practice concerning freedom of scientific
investigation and avoidance of military involvement. It could be
argued, therefore, that the Antarctic Treaty crystallized these earlier
practices into customary law. Second, there existed a world interest in
the Treaty's subject-matter. Third, participation in the Treaty could
be regarded as widely representative of the international community,
the Consultative Parties thus including all the states whose interests
are specially affected. Finally, there has been an absence of objection
to the Treaty (at least until 1983).
an arrangement, which excluded them from any economic benefits which may flow from
the exploitation of these resources." Brennan, Criteria for Access to the Resources of Ant-
arctica: Alternatives, Procedure, and Experience Applicable, in Vicufia, supra note 5, at 217,
218 (emphasis added). See also supra note 61.
68. See Note, Thaw in International Law? Rights in Antarctica Under the Law of Com-
mon Spaces, 87 YALE L.J. 804, 836 nn.149-50 (1978) (Consultative Parties tried not to raise
the red flag for other states).
69. Cf Recommendations III-VII and Explanatory Statement Concerning Recommen-
dations III-VII. See F.M. AUBURN, supra note 8, at 165-70; Boczek, supra note 8, at 386-
87.
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In contrast, several arguments have been put forward against this
view. One argument asserts that the Treaty is of anfinterim nature.
Article IV imposes a moratorium on claims. It does not purport to
regulate the question permanently. There is no provision on resource
allocation. In addition, jurisdictional questions are only partly
regulated.
Another critique notes that there is no clear indication that the
Consultative Parties have regarded any of the Treaty provisions as
reflecting customary law, which they could legally enforce against
third States.70
As the International Court of Justice stated in its North Sea Con-
tinental Shelf judgment, there is no doubt that a process by which a
treaty generates customary law is possible and does from time to time
occur. But the Court hastened to add that "this result is not lightly to
be regarded as having been attained. '71
The Court stated as the foremost requirement that the treaty pro-
vision concerned "should, at all events potentially, be of a fundamen-
tally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the
basis of a general rule of law."' 72 Admittedly, the quality of a treaty
rule as being of a fundamentally norm-creating character has meant
many things to many writers, but everyone will agree that if one had
to look for a textbook example of a treaty provision that is not poten-
tially norm-creating, article IV of the Antarctic Treaty would cer-
tainly be first choice.
The relevant question is whether provisions of the Antarctic
Treaty could have become binding as general-rather than as particu-
lar, local, or regional-customary law.7 3 It could be argued that even
the second alternative, which is the crystallization of respective cus-
tom interpartes, is foreclosed because of the basically interim charac-
ter of the 1959 Treaty. This interim nature, reflected most
prominently in article IV, embraces the Treaty as a whole, including
demilitarization and management of Antarctic affairs. Furthermore,
the Treaty is open for revision and subject to withdrawal.
70. W.M. BUSH, supra note 35, at 102-03.
71. Continental Shelf, supra note 45, at 41-42.
72. Id.
73. For an equivocal position on this topic, see Bilder, supra note 8, at 202. The cor-
rect view has been stated as follows:
At least a claimant dare not lower its guard completely in the matter of Antarctic
political questions unless and until this new treaty is acknowledged to be general
international lav applicable to all nations. At such time the legal status quo provi-
sions would prevent even non-parties from acquiring any additional titles, thus
granting a certain latent political, if not operational, prerogative to the twelve orig-
inal signatories, plus "active" acceding states.
Hayton, supra note 4, at 366.
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All indications suggest that the Consultative Parties to the Treaty
did not want to bind themselves beyond the Treaty either toward other
contracting parties or toward the world at large. In other words, they
wanted to retain the option of asserting their interests "by all means"
should the Treaty operation and cooperation break up. This feature of
the Antarctic Treaty system seriously reduces the possibility that both
the Treaty itself and the subsequent activities of the Consultative Par-
ties qualify as "state practice" or as expression of an opiniojuris on the
part of the states whose interests are specifically affected.
Furthermore, what would be the exact content of the alleged cus-
tomary rules? The attribution of an administrative competence as in
the case of the "public law" theories? This attribution would be mean-
ingless among the Consultative Parties themselves. Moreover, how
would the position of third states be affected? It is true that none of
these states appears to have objected to the Treaty of 1959 and the
subsequent practice of the Treaty parties, at least until the issue was
successfully brought before the U.N. But can this silence and inactiv-
ity of third states be taken as tacit acceptance and as an opiniojuris? I
doubt it very much. The purpose and intent of the parties to the 1959
Treaty were not that broad. The parties agreed to set aside conflicting
views about territorial sovereignty, to exclude Antarctica from the
arms race, to encourage and facilitate scientific cooperation, and to
protect the Antarctic environment. These states mainly assumed bur-
dens because the Treaty provisions they agreed on overwhelmingly
consisted of obligations and not of rights. Since 1959, the Consultative
Parties have taken utmost care to avoid the impression that they were
"carving Antarctica up for their own benefit."' 74
When the parties to a treaty assert constantly that their activities
are in the interest of all and that they do not desire to derive any
benefit from their activities which they do not already have (or claim
to have), the natural, spontaneous reaction of third states is a "let's
wait and see" attitude. When a more immediate interest is at stake,
third states are likely to accede to the treaty, without the necessity of
acceptance or protest. Their silence, therefore, cannot be qualified as
tacit acceptance of an obligation, i.e., as submission to a customary
law regime initiated by the Antarctic Treaty. In the words of Jim6nez
de Ar6chaga, "[third states] remained legally unconcerned by what
constituted for them res inter alios acta, retaining their freedom to take
a position ... only if and when the need to do so arose."'75 And the
need for third states to become legally concerned simply did not arise
74. Statement by Dr. J.A. Heap (United Kingdom delegate in the First Committee) on
29 November 1983, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 490, 492 (1983).
75. [1964] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 101.
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as long as the general attention did not flip to the mineral side of the
medal which the "Antarctic Club" awarded itself.
As a result, the Antarctic Treaty regime has not acquired an
"objective" character, or validity erga omnes, through the operation of
customary law. The principal reason for this result is the absence of a
dum loqui debuit situation. This absence marks a notorious red thread
through the application of the remaining theories.
Rights of the Consultative Parties could have become valid erga
omnes through historic consolidation resulting from the Consultative
Parties' effective administration of Antarctica and the lapse of a con-
siderable time.76 This approach, however, does not work with respect
to the Antarctic Treaty. No common claim or title to the region exists
upon which historic consolidation could operate. Historic consolida-
tion certainly cannot operate on the basis of a bifocal approach. The
start of such a process would presuppose, for claimant countries, a
transfer of slices of sovereignty to the Consultative Parties as a whole
and their joint administration. The Consultative Parties could then
assert sovereignty unambiguously vis-A-vis third states. Such a trans-
fer, however, has never taken place.77
Therefore, the only method remaining to provide the Antarctic
Treaty regime with some degree of validity erga omnes would be tacit
recognition through estoppel by silence or acquiescence. The present
paper will not go into the theoretical problem of how these processes
are to be distinguished from each other and again from that of forma-
tion of customary law. In fact, many customary obligations have
probably arisen through acquiescence. 78 In other situations, however,
passivity or toleration of claims which usually call for protest will not
grow into custom. As Hersch Lauterpacht has pointed out, the far-
reaching effect of creating legal obligations by silence and inaction is
an essential element in the promotion of stable international relations,
and is intended to prevent states from playing "fast and loose" with
situations affecting other states.79
Judge Alfaro described the starting point for acquiescence in his
opinion in the Temple case.80 The question is whether the conclusion
and subsequent operation of a treaty gives rise to "circumstances when
76. For this approach, see Rich, A Minerals Regime for Antarctica, 31 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 709, 714-15 (1982); Mfiller, supra note 5, at 173.
77. Barnes, supra note 8, at 288; Burton, supra note 8.
78. A. VERDROSS & B. SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VWLKERRECHT §§ 585-86 (3d ed.
1984).
79. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 396
(1950), quoting Miller, Acquiescence, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
5 (1984).
80. Case Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J.
39 (Separate Opinion of Judge Alfaro of June 15).
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protest is necessary according to the general practice of States in order
to assert, to preserve or to safeguard a right."' s
In the Fisheries judgment of 1951,82 the International Court of
Justice stressed the following prerequisites for the metamorphosis of
silence and toleration into "law-making" acquiescence: (1) notoriety
of claims challenging a legal situation or asserting alleged rights; and
(2) a general toleration of the claims by the international community
and prolonged abstention from reaction, especially by states particu-
larly interested, concerned, and affected. 83 Under this statement of the
law, we must again conclude that general silence, or absence of protest
in the face of the Antarctic Treaty system, cannot be taken as a tacit
recognition of the system by third states.
What were the claims of the contracting parties; what rights did
they assert? None which they had not asserted before-on the con-
trary, these claims were "frozen" by article IV of the Treaty. Cer-
tainly third states could not and cannot rely on this provision as such.
However, article IV is of certain relevance in this context. Thus, when
the Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (1972) considered
activities in the Treaty area by states that are not Contracting Parties,
an explicit reference was made to article IV.84
Moreover, the sovereignty problem affects the relationship
toward third parties as a matter of mere logic. The Treaty is aimed
essentially at the preservation of the status quo: article IV froze the
sovereignty issue without settling it. Neither claimant states nor non-
claimant states wanted to perfect an absolute title.8 5 It might well be
81. Id. at 45.
82. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgement of Dec. 18).
83. Id. at 138-39. See also Miller, supra note 79.
84. See Final Report:
Activities of Countries not Contracting Parties.
15. The Meeting considered the question of possible substantial or continuing
activities or territorial claims in the Antarctic Treaty Area by states that are
not Contracting Parties to the Treaty.
16. It agreed that, in such circumstances, it would be advisable for Governments
to consult together as provided for by the Treaty and to be ready to urge or
invite as appropriate the state or states concerned to accede to the Treaty,
pointing out the rights and benefits they would receive and also the responsi-
bilities and obligations of Contracting Parties.
17. The Meeting recalled the principles and purposes of the Treaty, in particular
that the Antarctic Treaty Area should continue to be a zone of peace and
scientific cooperation and should not become the scene or object of interna-
tional discord. In this connection the Meeting drew attention to the provi-
sions of article IV of the Treaty.
Reprinted in W.M. BusH, supra note 35, at 266. In 1975, the 8th Antarctic Treaty Con-
sultative Meeting reaffirmed the principles set forth in these paragraphs in Recommenda-
tion VIII-8, id. at 321-22.
85. See Peterson, supra note 8, at 400 ("By failing to locate sovereignty clearly, it leaves
open the possibility of shifting to any other regime at any time").
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argued that such a contradictory situation created by a policy of "con-
scious parallelism" 86 does not provide an operative basis for
acquiescence. 87
However, even if we assume that acquiescence had actually arisen
under the Antarctic Treaty, it would never result in a "once and for
all" attribution of competences. The acquiescence test, therefore,
would have to be applied on a state-by-state basis at every stage of the
regime.8 8 The Treaty provisions on the content of the Antarctic
regime were drafted carefully to avoid any assertive edges to which
third-state opposition could attach. The leitmotiv by which the
"Antarctic Club" has tried to "sell" its system to an increasingly
attentive world has always been to point out the considerable amount
of money and energy the "Club" has invested to keep Antarctica a safe
and clean place for all. Therefore, from their silence toward the activi-
ties of the "Club", no obligation has arisen for non-parties to the
Antarctic Treaty system to respect the regime. Non-parties remain
free to challenge the regime's operation.
These statements, however, should be qualified in two ways.
First, the situation in Antarctica is changing. The present analysis
may require adjustment to accommodate future developments. Sec-
ond, it may be possible that individual non-parties have gone beyond
quietly tolerating the operation of the Antarctic system by recognizing
or accepting it in one way or another.
These conclusions are consonant with those of a recent article by
Professor Triggs who studied the question of acquiescence by Third
World countries in the context of the United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). According to Professor Triggs, the
failure to raise the issue of an Antarctic minerals regime at UNCLOS
did not lead to acquiescence:
Until very recently, developing states ... have had no reason to take any inter-
est in Antarctica other than to voice what is possibly a general concern that the
Antarctic environment should be protected. Until the last twenty years, such
states have had no legal grounds on which to protest . . . . Only with the
development of the notion of a common heritage has it become possible for a
developing state to put forth the argument that, as it is part of the common
heritage of mankind, Antarctica is now, or should become, res communis. 89
Professor Triggs added, however, that because both the common heri-
tage principle and the outlines of the "Antarctic Club's" minerals
86. Barnes, supra note 8, at 288.
87. See supra note 62 (discussing the doubts regarding this position); see also Hambro,
supra note 64, at 225-26; Barnes, supra note 8, at 288.
88. See Wolfrum, Search for a Trustee, supra note 61, at 162 (the Consultative Parties
"must seek to accommodate the interests of the world community and to receive again
respective general acceptance for the new regime"). See also supra note 67 (discussing the
related problem of reciprocity).
89. Triggs, supra note 44, at 223.
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regime are now acquiring contours, further failure to object to these
plans could raise an estoppel. It appears that Professor Triggs has a
good point. There really is no need to strengthen it by introducing the
common heritage principle.
What we are observing is, indeed, a change of the legal paradigms
for Antarctica. The essence of the Antarctic regime created twenty-
five years ago has already been described: demilitarization, freedom of
scientific exploration for all, and protection of the environment. These
features represent obligations and burdens without any tangible bene-
fits exclusively for the "Antarctic Club." In addition, article IV
relaxes the sovereignty controversy between claimant and non-claim-
ant parties and suggests a low profile toward third states. Article X
could not be considered very provocative in light of the Treaty's prin-
ciples and purpose; utilization of resources was not at stake then.
Outsiders are now challenging the Antarctic system. The oppo-
nents want to share the eventual riches of Antarctica without assum-
ing the burdens of consultative or even simple Treaty membership.
They raise their voices against the old territorial claims, against any
third-party effect of the Treaty, and against the two-tiered structure of
participation in the Treaty ("nur wer kann, darf', or, "only those who
can, may"). They want to renegotiate the Antarctica regime in the
United Nations.
Against these attempts, the "Antarctic Club" members are strug-
gling to uphold the traditional paradigm. Their concern found a most
vivid expression in the statement of the British U.N. delegate who
said:
I challenge those who appear to be dissatisfied with the system to show any
obligation which the Treaty Consultative Parties have undertaken which it
would not be in the interests of any outsider to undertake if he became active in
Antarctica: I challenge them further to show anything which the Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Parties have done which is inconsistent with the real inter-
ests of an outsider now or with interests of future generations. 90
The, question, however, is whether the future minerals regime
will continue this lofty course. The main problem lies in the fact that
the current negotiations for such a regime pose a far greater challenge
to sovereignty claims than does the existing law on environment and
living resources. 91 Thus, the question that remains unanswered is:
will it be possible to fashion a regime acceptable to the claimant states
without privileging them to a degree unacceptable to non-claimants
and third states?
90. Statement by Dr. Heap, supra note 74.
91. Triggs, supra note 44, at 203.
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CONCLUSION
There is no question that the "Antarctic Club" is, morally and
legally, called upon in the first place to ensure the establishment of a
minerals regime consistent with the principles and purposes of the
Antarctic Treaty. But from this primary responsibility would in no
way follow a right of the "Club" to write another first place for itself
into the substance of that regime. Therefore, if in the course of negoti-
ations the Pandora's box that article IV has so far kept closed should
be opened and its content infect the regime with the element of "first
come, first served" successfully bridled in 1959, third states would be
under no obligation-moral or legal-to accept it. It could not be
maintained that the states of the Third World, by not having protested
against Recommendation XI-1 in time, have already acquiesced in a
minerals regime bearing club characteristics. 92 Such a view would fail
to grasp that, from the moment the question of Antarctica appeared
on the U.N. agenda, the fate of any regime negotiated within the
Antarctic Treaty framework will no longer be decided upon through
the play of claims and tolerances by states ut singuli.
92. But see Rich, supra note 76, at 714-15 (suggesting that, in the face of consistent
silence, "some form of estoppel" should operate against third parties).
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